

Examining informal defence and security arrangements' legalization: Canada–US agreements, 1955–2005

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Abstract

This article presents and examines a model of legalization on an original dataset of informal Canadian–US defence and security arrangements (DSA) formed between 1955 and 2005. Non-treaty arrangements permit US presidents to bypass Senate ratification, resulting in expediency and secrecy, both assets in defence and security relations. That withstanding, informal arrangements contain provisions responding to certain strategic problems. They detail aspects of legalization: delegation; obligations; and precision. Leaders select informal arrangements to incur fewer public commitments, but design them to ensure credibility. In that context, what factors shape informal DSA legalization? Propositions developed from delegation and rational institutionalist arguments identify the factors influencing informal DSA legalization. The Canada–US case is germane due to its “rules-based” nature and heterogeneity. An original dataset of the legal design of eighty-two bilateral DSA is introduced and analyzed. Results confirm cabinet shuffles and unified governments decrease DSA legalization while Democrat presidents and rising military threats increase it.

Keywords

US–Canada, defence and security cooperation, delegation theory, rational institutional design, legalization, Poisson model

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Notwithstanding the prominence of treaties as a public form of cooperation, empirically they are one of several forms that states choose among when contracting internationally. Agreements range in public nature and legalization, creating a vast understudied heterogeneity of arrangements,¹ notably in the realm of defence and security where incentives to control public access to the arrangement and knowledge about the partner's responsibilities are substantial. Scholars argue that publicizing a commitment (e.g., through legislative ratification) increases credibility² because costs for non-compliance increase. Despite governments' needs to credibly bind themselves to overcome the commitment problem, Lipson identifies reasons that states prefer informal arrangements for defence and security (DS).³ Distributional concerns, the need for DS policy secrecy, and party politics may complicate ratification, often moving agreements closer to legislative preferences.⁴ Thus, the secrecy, flexibility, and expediency of informal arrangements increases their desirability.

Commitment publicness via ratification is one method to invoke credibility, agreement design being the other.⁵ Bypassing legislative influence forsakes publicness, but whether legalization is also affected in informal contracting in DS is the puzzle under study. Koremenos argues that states design various arrangements (in differing sectors) in response to specific strategic problems.⁶ If she is correct, then assuming informal arrangements are designed without intent is problematic, to the extent that they outnumber formal DS treaties between many pairs of states. Most pairs of states are linked through a mix of both formal and informal agreements; democratic pairs of states are likely to use informal arrangements (over mixed or autocratic pairs). There exists a vast substructure of informal DS arrangements, contracted through memorandums of understanding, exchanges of diplomatic notes, agreements, etc.; they are the empirical majority of agreements, particularly among democratic states. The US manages over 450 bilateral formal and informal DS arrangements with its key allies in Europe, and over 700 including key allies in Asia.⁷ Given the empirical importance of those arrangements, a systematic study has potential to yield insight about how key international actors contract informally in the DS sector. Specifically, this study examines the extent to which informal defence and security arrangements (DSA) are legalized/binding

1. Charles Lipson argues that "the scale and the diversity of such accords indicate that they are an important feature of world politics, not rare and peripheral": Lipson, "Why are some international agreements informal?" *International Organization* 45, no. 4 (1991): 495–538, 498.
2. Helen Milner, *Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).
3. Lipson, "Why are some international agreements informal?"
4. Milner, *Interests, Institutions, and Information*.
5. Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal, "The rational design of international institutions," *International Organization* 55, no. 4 (2001): 761–800.
6. Barbara Koremenos, "When, what, and why do states choose to delegate?" *Law & Contemporary Problems* 71, no. 1 (2008): 151–192; Barbara Koremenos, "Exit, no exit," *Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law* 21, no. 1 (2010): 81–119.
7. Jennifer Kavanagh, "US security related agreements in force since 1955: Introducing a new database," RAND Corporation, RR763, 2014.

based on a set of domestic and international factors (e.g., cabinet instability, military threats, etc.). It analyzes the set of DSA for one pair of states, though possibilities for extension exist.

The article opens with a discussion of informal DSA, and presents legalization. It then examines why the Canada–US bilateral DS relationship is a critical case for empirical study in the context of understanding the legalization of DSA. Through the combination of both delegation and rational institutionalist arguments, a model of legalization is developed and tested using a quantitative approach on a dataset of Canada–US DSA. The article concludes by discussing the implications of the findings. The results of this study confirm that cabinet instability and single-party dominance in the US reduce legalization, while Democrat presidents and military threats increase legalization. Possibilities exist for extending the data to other allies or other pairs of democracies, suggesting this study can create a substantial research program.

Why select an informal DSA? What are the characteristics of legalization?

States cooperate in matters of DS by employing arrangements ranging on a continuum from formal treaties to verbal commitments,⁸ the middle populated with arrangements such as memorandums of understanding, exchanges of diplomatic notes, and agreements, among others.⁹ The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is an example of a DSA in the bilateral context. Most large DS cooperation datasets focus on formalized institutions,^{10,11} meaning NORAD and similar arrangements are absent from large-N studies. NORAD has been analyzed as a single case, but rarely in the context of all bilateral DSA. Informal arrangements¹² “underscore the fact that cooperation is often circumscribed and that its very limits may be fundamental to the participants. Their aim is often to restrict the scope and duration of agreements and to avoid any generalization of the implications.”¹³ There are also pragmatic (political) reasons that leaders prefer informal arrangements. They “are useful when states want to

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8. Lipson states that the distinctions between such agreements are ignored by international law, but “virtually all international commitments, whether oral or written, whether made by the head of state or a lower-level bureaucracy, are treated as ‘binding international commitments’”: Lipson, “Why are some international agreements informal?": 498.
 9. The differences due to the financial and negotiation costs associated according to senior Canadian negotiator, Robert Fowler, on the North American Aerospace Defense Command renewal negotiations: interview on 6 March 2014.
 10. David J. Singer and Melvin Small, “National alliance commitments and war involvement, 1815–1945,” *Peace Research Society (International) Papers* 5 (1966): 109–140; Brett Ashley Leeds and Sezi Anac, “Alliance institutionalization and alliance performance,” *International Interactions* 31, no. 3 (2005): 183–202.
 11. Except Lisa Martin’s research on US executive agreements: Martin, *Democratic Commitments: Legislatures and International Cooperation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
 12. These arrangements are informal due to the absence of “formal” legislative approval, but they are legally binding. Arrangements and agreements are used as synonyms.
 13. Lipson, “Why are some international agreements informal?": 537.

limit any broader, adverse implications of specific bargains.”¹⁴ However, the “irreducible price of maintaining flexibility” is the loss of credibility obtained from a public commitment.¹⁵

Informal arrangements have advantages over treaties, according to Lipson, including *flexibility*—the absence of ratification procedures—and are less public, permitting actors to *control information*.¹⁶ Flexibility allows the adaptation necessary for survival. It manifests in various ways. First, arrangements may contain provisions for a limited duration, renegotiation and renewal, and/or withdrawal (with or without notice periods or waiting periods¹⁷). Second, an amendment provision denotes flexibility. Finally, provisions for the management of disputes arising from the arrangement also indicate flexibility. The aforementioned provisions are characteristics of DSA legalization.

Existing research on legalization¹⁸ in cooperation is limited to economic cases such as regional political, economic bodies (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, MERCOSUR, etc.) or trade agreements.¹⁹ Other research considers the deepening versus widening trade-off regarding European integration.²⁰ It is influenced by arguments, based on either economics or interests. Economic-based arguments about how wealth or development shape cooperation²¹ are common. Others measure the impact of the number of partners on arrangement duration and scope.²² Though those arguments highlight strategic aspects, their actor-centric focus neglects how the need to limit the delegation of power shapes legal design.

Interest-based arguments for legalization asserted by liberal intergovernmentalists emphasize the “national interests” of partners,²³ while others point to “powerful domestic economic interests” and the partners’ “willingness” combined with

14. *Ibid.*, 526.

15. *Ibid.*, 534.

16. Lipson, “Why are some international agreements informal?”

17. A waiting period is the period of time before a member desiring to withdraw from an agreement is fully freed from its commitments, while a notice period is the amount of time from which a member gives notice of its intent to withdraw and the point at which withdrawal becomes effective: Koremenos, “Exit, no exit.” Agreements in Koremenos’s dataset rarely contain both types.

18. Also referred to as “bindingness.”

19. Douglas Stinnett, “Accounting for the depth of cooperation: The design of regional trade agreements” (paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, 2006).

20. Jörg Friedrichs, Jordan Mihov and Maria Popova, “Synergies and trade-offs in international cooperation: Broadening, widening, and deepening,” *European Integration Online Papers* 9, no. 13 (2005), <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2005-013.pdf> (accessed 12 November 2010); Andrew Moravcsik, “Negotiating the Single European Act: National interests and conventional statecraft in the European Community,” *International Organization* 45 (1991): 19–46.

21. Stephan Haggard, “Regionalism in Asia and the Americas,” in Edward Mansfield and Helen Milner, eds., *The Political Economy of Regionalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Pier Carlo Padoan, “Regional agreements as clubs: The European case,” in Mansfield and Milner, *Political Economy*.

22. Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965); Kenneth Oye, *Cooperation under Anarchy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

23. Friedrichs et al., “Synergies and trade-offs,” 5.

preference convergence.²⁴ Focusing on interests and economic arguments, omits the internal constraints preventing leaders from delegating power to an external institution. Finally, rational institutionalists have examined the legalization of formal DS alliances,^{25,26} informal agreements from all domains,²⁷ or trade agreements,²⁸ but no research targets informal DSA. In addition, the case study literature examines the European Union or European states,²⁹ lacking additional contextualization. As the existing literature is limited both theoretically (to interests and economics-based arguments) and empirically (to formal DS treaties or case studies), there is potential for this study to contribute empirically and theoretically to international relations and law, as well as to the study of Canadian–American relations.

The concept of legalization occupies rationalist institutionalists in political science and scholars of soft law. Delegation, obligations, and precision are key aspects of legalization.³⁰ Delegation pertains to how the rule-making and adjudicative powers are organized in an arrangement, while precision refers to the scope and clarity of mandates. Obligations are the partners' responsibilities. An agreement's level of legalization depends on the mix of different characteristics associated with those aspects. For example, flexible arrangements contain a particular mix of provisions associated with increased legalization because of the addition of flexibility clauses (e.g., amendment, and revision). DSA with a clear scope/mandate are likewise more legalized as with those containing dispute resolution provisions.

Koremenos shows that agreement design counters one or several strategic problems.³¹ Different strategic problems require particular designs, though unpacking

24. Moravcsik, "Negotiating the Single European Act"; Andrew Moravcsik, "Armaments among allies: European weapons collaboration, 1875–1985," in P. Evans, H. Jacobson and R. Putnam, eds., *Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Andrew Moravcsik, "Preferences and power in the European Community: A Liberal intergovernmentalist approach," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 31, no. 4 (1993): 473–524.
25. Brett Ashley Leeds, "Alliance reliability in times of war: Explaining state decisions to violate treaties," *International Organization* 57, no. 4 (2003): 801–827.
26. Leeds and Anac examine legalization in formal military alliances: Leeds and Anac, "Alliance institutionalization." Leeds and co-authors as well as Kathy Powers examine the institutional aspects of formal military alliances and regional trade agreements respectively, but neither examines legalization: Brett Ashley Leeds, Jeffrey Ritter, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Andrew Long, "Alliance treaty obligations and provisions, 1815–1944," *International Interactions* 28, no. 3 (2002): 237–260; Leeds, "Alliance reliability in times of war"; Kathy Powers, "Regional trade agreements as military alliances," *International Interactions* 30, no. 4 (2004): 373–395.
27. Koremenos, "When, what, and why"; Koremenos, "Exit, no exit."
28. Stinnett, "Accounting for the depth of cooperation."
29. Moravcsik, "Armaments among allies"; Michael Smith, *Europe's Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
30. Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal, "Hard and soft law in international governance," *International Organization* 54, no. 3 (2000): 421–456; Gregory Shaffer and Mark Pollack, "Hard versus soft law: Alternatives, complements and antagonists in international governance," *Minnesota Law Review* 94, no. 3 (2010): 706–799; Louis Bélanger and Kim Fontaine-Skronski, "Legalization in international relations: A conceptual analysis," *Social Science Information* 51, no. 2 (2012): 238–262.
31. Koremenos, "When, what, and why"; Koremenos, "Exit, no exit."

each arrangement's design aspects is beyond this article. A key conjecture of institutionalist design³² is that states prefer legalization in arrangements when faced with the strategic problems of uncertainty about the (future) state of the world (i.e., the security, economic, and political consequences of an agreement) and enforcement problems (i.e., incentives to cheat). Koremenos confirms those claims on a set of international agreements deposited at the UN across all contexts, including human rights, DS, and economics.³³

The US engages in the most extensive set of DSA. Kavanagh identifies more than 3,200 bilateral US-security-related treaties and arrangements in force since 1955.³⁴ Moreover, in the Canada–US DS context, the issues generating the most friction are characterized by distributional and enforcement concerns (i.e., defence industry benefits from DSA, NORAD's link to ballistic missile defence (BMD), and 1960s missile testing).³⁵ Therefore, examining Canada–US DSA systematically tests rational institutionalist claims in a novel context.

Canadian–American DSA as a critical case

The Canadian–American DS relationship differs from any other in the world, due to several enduring facts. First, *geography* produced a necessary relationship based in a cooperative framework. This bilateral relationship is so essential that Granatstein argues Canada's economic livelihood and “security as a nation depend on getting this relationship right,”³⁶ concluding that “cooperation is the only possible course... in the Canadian national interests.”³⁷

Second, the recognized asymmetric capacity required a “*rules-based*” institutional relationship where Canada's sovereignty is protected and its contribution based on economic and DS capabilities. Granatstein contends that “for Canada, the sole option is to cooperate meaningfully with the US in defence.”³⁸ The development of the second most linked DS relationship in the world³⁹ combined with the longest border generated a complex framework of DSA in areas ranging from classified information, communications to DS development projects, and operational planning. A preference for informality in the relationship began with the close personal relationship between Roosevelt and King. It developed in the

32. Koremenos et al., “The rational design of international institutions.”

33. Koremenos, “When, what, and why”; Koremenos, “Exit, no exit.”

34. Kavanagh, “US security related agreements,” 41.

35. See James Fergusson, *Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence, 1945–2009: Déjà vu all over again* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010); Bernard Brister, *The Same yet Different: Continuity and Change in the post-9/11 Canada–US Security Relationship* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2012); Brian Bow, *The Politics of Linkage: Power, Interdependence, and Ideas in Canada–US Relations* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009); Jack Granatstein, *Whose War is it?: How Canada can Survive in the Post 9/11 World* (Toronto: Phyllis Bruce Books, 2007).

36. Granatstein, *Whose War is it?*, 61.

37. *Ibid.*, 106.

38. *Ibid.*, 82.

39. The UK shares the most defence and security arrangements with the US due to nuclear cooperation related to defence: Kavanagh, “US security related agreements.”

post-war period, though it started with a 1938 speech at Kingston⁴⁰ and continued with a DSA at Ogdensburg in 1940 creating the first formal group, the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD).⁴¹ The binational PJBD, with a strategic planning mandate, clarified that “continental security was indivisible and could not be pursued by a single nation.”⁴² The PJBD is among many bilateral DSA, each varying in scope and legalization but together solidifying a networked relationship. The Military Cooperation Committee (MCC) was formed in 1946 to assist in PJBD tasks.⁴³ The committee adopted a *modus vivendi* based upon a recognition of sovereign equality, an agreement to build consensus and enhance informal contact, through bilateral arrangements to manage the “deepening bilateral defence relationship.”⁴⁴ The bilateral relationship was complemented in 1949 by a multilateral collective defence treaty, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In the decade after NATO’s founding, Soviet arms development convinced the partners that continental defence was insufficient, leading to another key DSA in 1958, NORAD. Its addition to the existing DSA brought a new level of commitment. NORAD has daily operational responsibilities, and creates one theatre of operations via the integration of the armed forces into one structure with shared funding, responsibilities, and leadership.⁴⁵ It is the backbone of the defence relationship and essential to Canadian sovereignty. NORAD is employed at the operational level in complementarity with the PJBD and MCC managing the strategic level.

Finally, the “rules-based” approach necessitated *flexibility* to withstand domestic politics in both states. DSA permit the US executives to centralize power by avoiding Senate approval, and are thus favoured under certain conditions. Though DSA bypass legislative scrutiny in the US, domestic politics affect the bilateral DS relationship on issues ranging from missile defence to acquisition, so it would be presumptuous to believe in an absence of influence. Moreover, ideological differences between the governments, combined with different philosophical views on the weight of defence spending in the federal budget relative to social spending, resulted in a DS relationship requiring room to accommodate change. Canada employed what Brister calls a policy of accommodation, combining “quiet diplomacy” (ensuring access/communication flow) with “defence against help” (assuring sovereignty).⁴⁶ The Canadian policy “has been to provide enough defence to keep the Americans out of Canada and to defend us against their help.”⁴⁷ The tension

40. Known today as the “Kingston Dispensation,” in this verbal commitment America promised to defend Canada if threatened from another empire, while “Canada would make itself as immune to attack as could be reasonably expected and that enemy forces would not be able to pursue their way by either land, sea or air to the US across Canada”: Brister, *The Same yet Different*, 50.

41. Brister, *The Same yet Different*.

42. *Ibid.*, 144.

43. Joel Sokolsky and Joseph Jockel, *Fifty Years of Canada–United States Defence Cooperation: The Road from Ogdensburg* (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1992), 59.

44. Dwight Mason, “The Canadian-American North American defence alliance in 2005,” *International Journal* 60, no. 2 (2005): 385–396, 386.

45. *Ibid.*, 387.

46. Brister, *The Same yet Different*, 63.

47. Granatstein, *Whose War is it?*, 98.

about how closely to align DS policy with the US operationally and philosophically permeates the history of the relationship, and as such, historically Canada has confronted a “credibility gap”⁴⁸ at different points. But the DSA of NORAD and NATO has meant that DS policy decisions on key issues are pre-aligned with the Americans.⁴⁹

Other attributes of that “rules-based” relationship is circumscribed in a set of DSA variously refining each partner’s commitments. The DSA characteristics increasing adaptability (e.g., review/renewal) also open them to politicization by national DS spending decisions and the effects of exogenous shock. If the Canada–US DSA are designed without rational intent, the differences in legalization across them are random and should not vary with political conditions. Examining a large sample of DSA (from 1955 until 2005)⁵⁰ provides an original analysis of the relationship. Findings confirm that several factors influence DSA legalization (i.e., those associated with internal politics (stability and unity) and external (power) politics), further substantiating internal–external links in foreign policy.⁵¹

Developing a model of DSA legalization: Theoretical arguments and empirical measures

Theories of delegation and rational institutional design both identify factors shaping legalization. Uncertainty caused by the external environment (i.e., threats) is associated with more legalized arrangements containing scope limits and transparent obligation provisions to manage uncertainty. Domestic political instabilities caused by internal demands for policy distribution elsewhere or threats to government unity are also linked to increased legalization to ensure enforcement.⁵² As both the internal and external political environments shape legalization, two sets of factors are identified: one examines geostrategic and international economic factors,⁵³ while the other explores aspects of the domestic environment.

Military threats are a geostrategic factor. Increasing military threats lead to increasingly legalized agreements consistent with power-based arguments,⁵⁴ as

48. Brister, *The Same yet Different*, 85.

49. Danford Middlemass and Joel Sokolsky, *Canadian Defence: Decisions and Determinants* (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1989); Edna Keeble, “Rethinking the 1971 White Paper and (Pierre Elliott) Trudeau’s impact on Canadian defence policy,” *American Review of Canadian Studies* 27, no. 4 (1997): 545–569.

50. The start year follows three major events occurring in 1949 for the Americans: the communist victory in China; the publication of NSC-68 promoting the doctrine military containment (versus Kennan’s ideological containment proposed in 1947); and the Berlin airlift confirming the necessity for cooperation to manage the communist threat.

51. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph Siverson and James Morrow, *The Logic of Political Survival* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2003).

52. Recalling enforcement and future uncertainty as the aforementioned strategic problems.

53. The confirmation that international factors influence cases of bilateral arrangements is a particularly tough test of the data due to possible collinearity.

54. Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw Hill Inc, 1979); Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).

well as rationalist interpretations of the commitment problem.⁵⁵ Increasing capabilities complicate a country's ability to avoid exploiting future advantages. Thus, as the military capacity of the partner's primary rival becomes more developed, the partners increasingly legalize cooperation to manage future uncertainty. Threats are measured as the ratio of rival military spending over the total spending of the partners.

Proposition 1: As the ratio of rival military spending to total partner military spending increases, DSA legalization increases.

The other geostrategic factor is economic interdependence between the partners, despite ambiguous expectations of its effect on legalization. Liberalists argue that economic interdependence and international cooperation create a virtuous circle,⁵⁶ but there is no expectation about the legalization or design of such cooperation, despite its likelihood. Rationalists assert that economic interdependence provides information,⁵⁷ and interdependent states experience less "noise" interacting. That increase in "certainty" permits more accurate predictions of each other's behaviours. In essence, actors are less prone to incorrectly guess intentions. Rational institutionalists anticipate that legalization (i.e., "centralization") increases with uncertainty about future actor behaviour.⁵⁸ Together, those claims suggest increasing interdependence decreases DSA legalization, as the interdependence serves as a proxy for diminishing uncertainty regarding future behaviour.

Proposition 2: Increasing economic interdependence decreases DSA legalization.

Domestic factors influencing foreign policy⁵⁹ include: the extent to which the ruling party controls government;⁶⁰ elite preference divergence;⁶¹ and the trade-off between national versus social security.⁶² Delegation theory advances the idea that internal uncertainty encourages leaders to design less legalized agreements. As constraints differ across the varieties of democracies, some executives (e.g., prime ministers versus presidents) are institutionally less hindered by the legislature.

55. James Fearon, "Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes," *American Political Science Review* 88, no. 3 (1994): 577–592; Koremenos et al., "The rational design of international institutions."

56. John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2000).

57. William Reed, "Information and economic interdependence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47, no. 1 (2003): 54–71.

58. Koremenos et al., "The rational design of international institutions."

59. Bueno de Mesquita et al., *The Logic of Political Survival*.

60. David Clark, "Agreeing to disagree: Domestic institutional congruence and US dispute behavior," *Political Research Quarterly* 53, no. 2 (2000): 375–401; Joanne Gowa, *Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

61. Moravcsik, "Negotiating the Single European Act"; Moravcsik, "Armaments among allies"; Moravcsik, "Preferences and power"; Andrew Moravcsik and Kalypso Nicolaidis, "Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam: Interests, influences, institutions," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 37, no. 1 (1999): 59–85.

62. Robert Powell, *In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Anessa L. Kimball, "Political survival, the distributional dilemma, and alliance formation," *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 4 (2010): 407–419.

Additionally, US presidents may find themselves *de facto* constrained by divided government.

The US presidential system has a separation between the executive and legislature, while Canada's parliamentary system results in a *de jure* fusion.⁶³ In the US, control of the government increases if a single party "controls" the executive and both chambers of the legislative branch,⁶⁴ each representing different electoral bases. Unified government shapes trade policy⁶⁵ and conflict behaviour.⁶⁶ When government is divided, it is difficult to implement divisive and/or costly policies; as more actors exercise power over policy (i.e., veto players), the likelihood of retaining the status quo increases.⁶⁷ In contrast, unified government creates increased delegation to the executive.⁶⁸ Delegation theory suggests that in relationships where there are complex principals (i.e., divided government), room exists for agent "misbehaviour."⁶⁹ It follows that relationships are increasingly legalized as a response. As such, when the preferences of complex principals converge, as in unified government, then DSA are less likely to require the increasing legalization through additional provisions. An unconstrained president may signal commitment so strongly that highly legalized DSA are unnecessary for credible cooperation. Risk aversion also explains decreasing DSA legalization with a powerful president, particularly as these analyses employ agreements lacking legislative ratification.⁷⁰

Proposition 3: US unified government decreases DSA legalization.

Government "control" in Canada is measured differently as the parliamentary system fuses the executive and legislative. The informational signals of "control" differ between the parliamentary and presidential visions of democracy. Increased control permits the executive in a parliamentary system to commit the government to a greater extent because there is no competition to direct (foreign) policy between government branches (as in the US Constitution). Minority governments are susceptible to policy stagnation because of veto players,⁷¹ and are more likely to face confidence votes. There were eight minority governments from 1950 until 2005. The constraints produced by veto players in parliamentary systems result in less legalized arrangements. Constrained governments pursue moderate policies to

63. This results in two different practices of foreign policy governing: in parliamentary systems delegation to executive prerogative due to shared preferences is key to system efficiency, whereas in the US system not only is foreign policy power shared between the executive and legislature, but the upper house has more policy influence than its Canadian counterpart.

64. The upper chamber in the US has key foreign policy powers absent from upper chambers in Westminster systems.

65. Gowa, *Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade*.

66. Clark, "Agreeing to disagree".

67. George Tsebelis, "Veto players and institutional analysis," *Governance* 13, no. 4 (2000): 441–474.

68. Milner, *Interests, Institutions, and Information*; Martin, *Democratic Commitments*.

69. Darren Hawkins, David Lake, Daniel Nielson and Michael Tierney, *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 46.

70. In a bilateral context where Canada was hesitant to bind too closely to the US in DS: Bow, *The Politics of Linkage*; Brister, *The Same yet Different*.

71. Tsebelis, "Veto players."

prevent internal divisions from leading to government removal. Consistent with veto player arguments, as the majority party's control of the government increases, DSA legalization also increases.

Proposition 4: As the percentage of seats held by the majority party in the Canadian parliament gets larger, DSA legalization increases.

As policy control by the government increases, the resulting effect is to make agreements increasingly legalized. Government stability also shapes legalization as ministers are delegated the power to negotiate DSA by the executive. Cabinet shuffles represent executive uncertainty/instability, so rationalists anticipate less legalized arrangements: "Reshuffles destroy the informational gains that prolonged ministerial tenure can bring, and in so doing undermine political (i.e., the cabinet's) control of the bureaucracy."⁷² Shuffles may be a response to domestic troubles, a tactic to restore confidence. Alternatively, Kam and Indridason argue that shuffles help executives manage the moral hazard problem among ministers because they occur in the absence of troubles. They continue, "Cabinet ministers have inherently mixed motives, depending on their party's continued electoral success to stay in power, but having every incentive to use their departments to serve their own ambitions (for a more prestigious cabinet post, the leadership, etc.)."⁷³ Nonetheless, shuffles signal uncertainty and, perhaps, bureaucratic inefficiency. They occur more frequently in Canada. Motivations for shuffles in parliamentary systems include encouraging party discipline, fortifying strength relative to the minority, or other strategic objectives. In contrast, US cabinet shuffles are empirically less frequent. Cabinet changes indicate executive uncertainty and instability, and as they increase, legalization decreases.

Proposition 5 (6): As the number of cabinet shuffles increases, DSA legalization decreases.

Elections produce uncertainty. US elections create substantial public and government uncertainty regarding how a new president might shift policy on issues central to Canadian interests. Though democracies fulfill commitments,⁷⁴ a new president may redirect, as well as re-order, foreign policy priorities, creating uncertainty. Thus, agreements formed during presidential election years are more legalized due to uncertainty about the state of the future, and states prefer binding the current government.⁷⁵

Proposition 7: Agreements formed in US presidential election years are more legalized than those formed in non-election years.

A final constraint shaping DSA legalization is ideological differences between partners. Ideological distance between governments increases uncertainty around

72. Christopher Kam and Indridi Indridason, "Cabinet reshuffles and ministerial drift," *British Journal of Political Science* 38, no. 4 (2008): 621–656, 621.

73. *Ibid.*, 622.

74. Leeds, "Alliance reliability in times of war." For an opposing view, see Erik Gartzke and Kristian Gleditsch, "Why democracies may be less reliable allies," *American Journal of Political Science* 48, no. 4 (2004): 775–795.

75. Koremenos et al., "The rational design of international institutions."

policy signals. Research suggests that distance between parties within a government makes the creation of coherent foreign policy difficult.⁷⁶ Tsebelis's veto player argument asserts that increasing ideological distance between veto holders encourages policy stagnation.⁷⁷ Ideological distance between foreign governments affects behaviour similarly. Therefore, increasing ideological distance between governments decreases DSA legalization.⁷⁸

Proposition 8: As the ideological distance between governments increases, DSA legalization decreases.

Finally, other demands for domestic policy goods also shape DSA. Powerful states can pursue security and defence policy unilaterally. For example, the diversity and depth of the American economy permits substantial deficit spending, if necessary, to ensure capacity. On the other hand, Canada's military capacity is smaller, less diversified, and shaped by other spending. Canada is an example of a state facing the "guns versus butter" dilemma.^{79,80} This dilemma suggests that the more a state allocates towards guns, the less it can allocate towards butter (i.e., social policy). While allocations towards national security ensure the state's survival, allocations towards social goods enhance the leader's survival. Thus, leaders must create an efficient and effective balance between the goods to retain office. Canadian governments have had a social welfare commitment since the Medical Care Act of 1966. Thus, to the extent that they allocate resources towards "butter," resources remaining for "guns" (i.e., DS goods) are limited. As Canadian social spending increases, a corresponding increase in legalization is expected.

Proposition 9: Increasing Canadian social spending increases DSA legalization.

The claim that phased agreements are more legalized is examined. Downs and colleagues argue that phased agreements enable tighter cooperation.⁸¹ Each newly negotiated phase allows the signatories to revisit and amend the earlier agreement based on information revealed in the inter-negotiation intervals, with the following agreement building in legalization upon its predecessor. Thus, phased agreements are more legalized. Having identified the factors influencing the legalization of DSA,⁸² the next paragraphs detail the measures and research design.

76. Mark Haas, *The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics: 1789–1989* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005); James Deleat and James Scott, "Treaty-making and partisan politics: Arms control and the US Senate, 1960–2001," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 2, no. 2 (2006): 177–200; Charles Kupchan and Peter Trubowitz, "Grand strategy for America divided," *Foreign Affairs* 86, no. 4 (2007).

77. Tsebelis, "Veto players."

78. Hawkins et al., *Delegation and Agency*, 46.

79. Powell, *In the Shadow of Power*.

80. The guns–butter dilemma rests on several assumptions: that resources are scarce; budgets are finite; and the balance between these two goods determines current and future consumption possibilities. Kimball demonstrates that the demand for social spending shapes defence and security treaty formation: Kimball, "Political survival."

81. George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom, "Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation?" *International Organization* 50, no. 3 (1996): 379–406.

82. Another control variable examines if defence and security arrangements designed during the Cold War are more legalized.

The identification of empirical measures is required to examine the relationship between the proposed factors and DSA legalization. First, a measure of legalization, the research object here, is needed. Legalization is captured by identifying the DSA provisions associated with the three aspects of legalization (delegation, obligation, and precision). As an initial step, all bilateral written DSA texts⁸³ were collected from each government's treaty division, the UN treaty series, and other electronic as well as archival sources. For each arrangement, a questionnaire examining details ranging from the historical context to its technical details was completed. A numeric coding scheme, inspired by the rational design program, was employed, converting textual responses to numeric data⁸⁴ for eighty-two agreements.⁸⁵ Finally, a measure of legalization was developed by summing the relevant provisions. The legalization measure aggregates the aspects of the DSA associated with delegation, obligations, as well as how it is managed. DSA legalization ranges from 0 to 37 with a mean of 14 and a standard deviation of 9.⁸⁶

Figure 1 illustrates the legalization value for each DSA the year it entered force.⁸⁷ Several observations are noteworthy. First, the data are heterogeneous, as DSA are neither consistently legalized nor increasingly legalized over time. One-third of the DSA score at least 20; though only six DSA are highly legalized (above 30). Among the most legalized DSA are the 1994 DSA on Counterterrorism Research and Development, DSA associated with NORAD in 1955 and 1981, and the 2002 Joint Strike Fighter DSA. The least legalized DSA are extensions (of other DSA, e.g., 1976), equipment loans, or amendments (to other DSA, e.g., 1984) Second, there is no temporal pattern in the data: DSA varying significantly in legalization enter force in the same year (e.g., four 1971 DSA ranging in legalization from 1 to 21 associated with managing NORAD, or 1955 DSA on Atomic Information for Mutual Defence, PJBD, and NORAD). Finally, there are no years with an abundance of DSA (e.g., end of the Cold War, or following 9/11).

The factors shaping the legalization of DSA are identified above.⁸⁸ They include rival military spending relative to the pair's spending, economic interdependence, US unified government, the strength of the parliamentary majority, Canadian/US cabinet shuffles, presidential elections in the US, the ideological distance between governments, and the level of Canadian social spending. All require measures for statistical study. The ratio of rival military spending over total military spending for the pair is calculated from the Composite Index of

83. Excluding formal treaties.

84. A copy of the questionnaire and numeric coding form is available.

85. A full list of the agreements is available. A third of the cases are associated with the North American Aerospace Defense Command.

86. See Appendix Table 1. Some provisions are assigned more points based on arguments advanced by Abbott and Snidal, "Hard and soft law in international governance." Results are unaffected if each provision is given equal weight.

87. Defence and security arrangements' start year is the unit for all analyses. Replication materials available at dataverse.harvard.edu (doi:10.7910/DVN/9D3PSO).

88. All variables were lagged to ensure the appropriate temporal relationship.




Figure 1. Legalization level of individual Canadian–US defence and security arrangements.

National Capability,⁸⁹ measuring demographic, industrial, and military capability.⁹⁰ The period of 1955–1990 uses data for the USSR, and after 1990 data for China. The variable ranges between 0.06 and 1.5, indicating increasing rival military dominance relative to the partners with a mean of 0.76 and a standard deviation of 0.43. A measure of economic interdependence accounting for both its salience and symmetry between the partners⁹¹ is used.⁹² Unified government and election year data were provided by Gowa⁹³ with updates for the 81st–86th and 109th Congresses from the Congress website. A binary variable equal to 1, if the Democratic Party controls the executive and both chambers of Congress. Data for majority party control in Canada was provided by Elections Canada. The percentage of seats in parliament controlled by the majority ranges between 41% and 78%.

89. David J. Singer, Stuart Bremer and John Stuckey, “Capability, uncertainty, and Major Power war, 1820–1965,” in Bruce Russett, ed., *Peace, War, and Numbers* (New York: SAGE, 1972).
 90. From the EUGene program: D. Scott Bennett and Allan Stam, “EUGene: A conceptual manual,” *International Interactions* 26, no. 2 (2000): 179–204. (<http://eugenesoftware.org>) [v.3.03] Some models reported are limited to 2000 due to the military data; however, alternative models using the balance of nuclear weapons (available until 2010) yield similar substantive results (i.e., as rival military power rises, so does defence and security arrangements legalization).
 91. Katherine Barbieri, *The Liberal Illusion: Does Trade Promote Peace?* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002).
 92. Those data end in 2000; alternative models using bilateral export data yield similar results.
 93. Gowa, *Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade*.

Cabinet shuffle data were collected from US archival resources.⁹⁴ Canadian cabinet shuffle data were provided by Kam and Indridason,⁹⁵ with updates from the website of the Ministry of the Prime Minister of Canada. The number of cabinet shuffles in a given year is employed. Ideological distance data employ the Kim–Fording Government and Party Ideology indices⁹⁶ calculated from the Comparative Manifestos Project.⁹⁷ The Comparative Manifestos Project codes ideology based on party platforms ranging from 0 (indicating right ideologies) to 100 (left ideologies). A measure accounting for the difference⁹⁸ between the ideology scores of the parties in power in both states is created ranging from 0.4 (indicating extremely close ideologies) to 42, with a mean of 16 and a standard deviation of 11. When the partners are ideologically distant, DSA should be less legalized due to both uncertainty and increased policy distance. Phases of DSA were identified from cross-references to earlier relevant agreement(s) in the text. Finally, social spending data (from Statistics Canada) are in millions of dollars.

The dependent variable sums the legal characteristics of an arrangement. As legalization ranges from 0–37 with no intermediary values, and there is no evidence of contagion,⁹⁹ the Poisson model¹⁰⁰ is preferred. The coefficients indicate each factor’s effect on an expected count of the legalized aspects of an arrangement. The temporal limits of the economic data constrain the number of cases, so several models are proposed. As this is the first study of DSA legalization for the pair of states, it is recommended to present parsimonious results before complex models. First, a model of the geostrategic environment is presented. This is followed by another model examining internal factors. Finally, a third model combines both sets of factors while accounting for possible collinearity concerns¹⁰¹ and the effect of Democrat presidents on DSA legalization. This article’s original contributions are both a dataset of bilateral DSA as well as an empirical measure of legalization.

Table 1 reports results for Poisson models estimating expected DSA legalization. The second column identifies the proposition. In column 3, Model A presents results for the international factors model examining rival military spending and economic interdependence. Results are indeterminate, though interdependence is in the anticipated direction. Going beyond the Canada–US context to increase case

94. Annual US cabinet shuffle data is from presidential library websites and that of President of the United States. A list of sources is available.

95. Christopher Kam and Indridason, “The timing of cabinet reshuffles in five Westminster parliamentary systems,” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 30, no. 3 (2005): 327–363; Kam and Indridason, “Cabinet reshuffles and ministerial drift.”

96. HeeMin Kim and Richard C. Fording, “Voter ideology in Western democracies: An update,” *European Journal of Political Research* 42, no. 1 (2003): 95–105.

97. Ian Budge, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Andreas Volkens, Judith Bara and Eric Tanenbaum, with Richard Fording, Derek Hearl, HeeMin Kim, Michael McDonald and Silvia Mendez, *Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments 1945–1998* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

98. The absolute distance it uses to normalize the values.

99. The variance does not exceed the mean; thus, a negative binomial approach is not required.

100. The Poisson model’s econometric specification appears in J. Scott Long, *Regression Models for Limited Dependent Variables* (Thousand Oaks: SAGE, 1997), 223.

101. Collinearity among variables in moderate-sized samples (< 100 cases) can affect results.

Table 1. Effects of proposed factors on the legalization of Canada–US defence and security arrangements from 1955–2005.

		Model A: International	Model B: Domestic	Model C: Mixed
(Rival's/bilateral total) military spending	P1: +	−0.0165 (0.1817)	—	0.3005* (0.1747)
Economic interdependence	P2: −	−0.0020 (0.0018)	—	—
Unified US government	P3: −	—	−0.0488 (0.1167)	−0.6006* (0.1517)
Percentage parliamentary majority in Canada	P4: +	—	−0.0056 (0.0044)	0.0045 (0.0044)
Canadian cabinet shuffles	P5: −	—	−0.1435* (0.0556)	−0.1615* (0.0559)
US cabinet shuffles	P6: −	—	−0.0043* (0.0024)	−0.0049* (0.0023)
Presidential election year	P7: +	—	0.0655 (0.1024)	—
Democrat US president	P7b: +	—	—	0.5196* (0.1498)
Ideological distance between governments	P8: −	—	0.0041 (0.0036)	−0.0022 (0.0046)
Canadian social spending	P9: +	—	0.1263* (0.0521)	—
Phased agreements	CV	−0.3063* (0.0758)	−0.2719* (0.0826)	−0.2765* (0.0769)
Cold War	CV	−0.0216 (0.2683)	0.1656 (0.1574)	−0.2035 (0.1915)
Constant	N/A	2.6657* (0.2535)	2.0207* (0.6206)	2.5291* (0.3320)
Number of observations		55	59	63
Log likelihood		−258.136	−268.005	−275.753
Likelihood-ratio Chi-squared		20.12*	40.98*	50.74*

Note: standard errors reported in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$.

numbers would increase understanding of the influence of international factors.¹⁰² Cold War DSA were not more legalized, and multiphase DSA are unexpectedly less legalized. Further data examination reveals that multiphase-agreements are extensions of earlier ones; most do not change the original agreement's terms, thus are no more legalized than the initial arrangement. The argument of Downs and colleagues¹⁰³ assumes each phase increased legalization; however, these data differ.¹⁰⁴ Results for the international factors model are shaped by the bilateral context of the data; the collection of more data, and comparisons of each state with other partners, is required.

Model B examines seven propositions related to internal factors; three are validated. Results confirm that cabinet shuffles in both countries decrease legalization, supporting claims that internal instability deters binding agreements. Moreover, based on the magnitude of the effects, cabinet instability in Canada is more detrimental to legalization than its American equivalent. As Canada increases social spending, DSA legalization increases, supporting the finding that leaders balance the tasks of providing sufficient social and national security.¹⁰⁵ The other four propositions are not supported, though unified government and election year are in the expected direction. Finally, multiphase arrangements are less legalized.

Legalization of bilateral DSA is more likely when the president is a Democrat, given that the relationship relies on respect of its "rules-based" nature. Historically, Canada is reluctant to cede sovereignty in the context of the DS relationship to Republican leaders (Reagan—Strategic Defense Initiative; Bush—BMD, Iraq). Republicans prioritize DS as a policy domain more than Democrats, but they also prefer DS policy autonomy over policy coordination. In contrast, Democrats embrace engagement in a "rules-based" system with the protections and certainty it provides. Thus, Model C examines whether Democrat presidents are linked to increased DSA legalization. In this model, interdependence is omitted to increase sample size. Concerns about collinearity between variables when examining moderate-sized samples (<100 cases) necessitates prudence in specification. Unified government may result from elections, so including both variables is problematic. Thus, the election year variable as well as Canadian social spending (related to the military spending ratio) are omitted. The final model confirms that rival military spending and Democrat presidents increase DSA legalization, while cabinet instability in both countries and unified US government decrease legalization. Five of the seven propositions are supported empirically, and the final two are in the anticipated direction but insignificant. The results of this article suggest that informal arrangements, properly designed from a legal perspective, bind the partners effectively and unvaryingly in the face of uncertainty due to domestic instability or external threats.

102. Model A has the smallest number of observations since the interdependence data end in 1992.

103. Downs et al., "Good news about compliance."

104. Re-estimating Model A, excluding "simple extension" agreements, shows economic interdependence is negatively related to legalization and significant as expected, indicating a need for further study.

105. Kimball, "Political survival."




Figure 2. Expected defence and security arrangements legalization (Model C) varying with domestic cabinet instability and external threats.

Implications for Canada–US relations and future extensions

One way to understand the implications of the results is to calculate expected values of DSA legalization under different contexts. Figure 2 compares the predicted legalization of the “average¹⁰⁶ agreement” based on Model C (i.e., the line connecting the diamonds) as the parliamentary majority in Canada increases. Increasing cabinet instability in both states reduces expected legalization¹⁰⁷ from 11 to 3 “provisions” in cases of minority governments in Canada (a 72% reduction), and 13 to 4 for governments with the largest majority margins. Increases in rival military spending increase expected DSA legalization from 11 provisions to 13 under minority governments, and from 13 to 15 for the governments winning the largest mandates. Figure 3 compares the expected legalization for an “average agreement” from the third model (again the line connecting the diamonds) as the parliamentary majority strengthens. Unified US governments are associated with decreases in legalization ranging from 11 provisions to 7 (36%) for minority governments to 13 to 8 for majority governments. Finally, the expected reduction in legalization due to cabinet shuffles is illustrated by the triangles. Predictions show that maximum cabinet instability in Canada combined with moderate American cabinet instability under unified government reduces legalization by nearly 4

106. The calculations in the figures employ the average value for all ordinal and interval variables and the mode for dichotomous variables. See Long, *Regression Models*, 217–230, for details.

107. Loosely interpreted as the number of provisions associated with legalization in the agreement.




Figure 3. Expected defence and security arrangements legalization varying with unified US government and domestic cabinet instability.

provisions on average. The figures illustrate the magnitude of the effects of several key propositions confirmed by the analyses.

This article supports claims drawn from rational institutionalist and delegation perspectives when examining an original dataset of bilateral DSA. Most propositions were confirmed and implications were illustrated based on how the average DSA legalization is affected given changes in significant factors. Results confirm that cabinet instability in either partner as well as unified government in the US reduce DSA legalization, while rival military spending and Democrat US presidents are associated with more legalized DSA. More generally, results confirm that international and domestic factors significantly affect DSA legalization. Finally, the magnitude of the effects appears stronger for domestic variables (i.e., instability) than international ones (i.e., threats), supporting the liberalist claims of the importance of domestic politics shaping foreign policy.

Thus, despite forgoing formal arrangements, states design DSA with intent and their legalization varies with domestic and international conditions. Whether support for these same propositions extends beyond the Canada–US bilateral case to other cases is an empirical question requiring more data. Since cabinet instability and military spending varies widely among the closest allies of the US, it is also likely that DSA legalization is equally diverse. Based on the bilateral study results, the project is expanding to DSA between Europe and North America.¹⁰⁸ Data

108. The working list of the Transatlantic and Inter-European defence and security arrangements contains over 200 cases.

reveal that agreements formed in the years immediately following the end of the Cold War and 9/11 are increasingly legalized regarding obligations, delegation, and precision.

European allies provide a starting point, since a long history of regional cooperation in multiple domains exists. Moreover, US bilateral DS cooperation exceeds 450 DSA (less than one-quarter formal treaties). Given the variations identified in the US–Canadian case of eighty-two DSA and the confirmed results, a substantial contribution both theoretically and empirically to the study of international security cooperation and DSA legal design is possible by increasing the dataset and including the heterogeneity offered by existing data on cabinet instability and military spending data cross-nationally in analyses. When complete, the North America–European DSA data combined with formal alliance data will permit the analysis of the choice between formal and informal arrangements.

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Appendix Table I. Components of the additive index of defence and security arrangements legalization measuring agreement obligations, precision, and delegation.

Each is equal to 1 point:

- Obligations are contingent upon
 - the availability of funds (Q28)
 - something else (Q29)
-

(continued)

Continued.

There are

- territorial restrictions (Q31)
- limits to the scope (Q32)
- other limits on obligations (Q38)

Goal(s)

- technological improvement (Q23)
- provide an extension of a previous agreement (Q23)
- provide logistical or monetary support (Q23)

The limits in agreement scope are related to compliance with domestic law (Q33)

Agreement specifies (military, financial, and/or technical) contribution levels (Q54)

Each is equal to 2 points:

There are provisions to

- amend the agreement (Q11)
- renew the agreement (Q12)

Agreement requires

- cross-bureaucratic coordination within each state (Q35)
- cross-bureaucratic coordination between the countries (Q36)
- coordination across branches of the military in both states (Q37)
- consultation between partners before contracting to third parties (Q43)
- official contact among the military forces of the partners (Q48)

Agreement contains

- provisions for mediation/arbitration of disputes (Q47)
- provisions for arms reductions (Q56)
- statements about non-military cooperation (Q65)
- provisions for economic aid or other enticements (Q70)
- provisions relevant to delays in cooperation caused by internal processes (Q72)

Agreement describes/references

- other means through which states will coordinate military efforts/policies (Q57)
- companion agreements (Q64)
- unresolved conflicts between the parties (Q66-67)
- the circumstances under which one partner may intervene in the internal political arena of another partner (Q71)

Agreement proposes other agreements regarding issues among the partners (Q68)

Obligations are symmetric for the partners (Q41)

Benefits are equal for the partners (Q42)

Agreement provides for an integrated command of military forces (Q50)

There are limits regarding contribution levels (Q55)

The goal is to

- exchange information (Q23)
 - adapt to a new security context (Q23)
-